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Abstract
This paper considers job market signalling in the software industry where
individual programmers engage themselves in open source software projects
in order to signal their skills to commercial software companies. We provide
a novel signalling game where signalling in the labor market has a (positive
or negative) product market externality eﬀect due to the appearance of free
open source programs. We show how the least cost separating equilibrium
of the signalling game is aﬀected by product market externalities, and how
this is reßected in the quality of goods supplied in the market. Spences
(1973,1974) original case turns out to be a special case of ours when market
externalities are absent. We also show that in the case of strong positive
market externalities, i.e. with complementarity between OS and commercial
programs, the separation of programmers types may be impossible.
JEL ClassiÞcation numbers: D23, D82.
Keywords: Signalling, Labor market, Open source software.
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1 Introduction
This paper is inspired by two observations from the open source software
environment and software industry in general. It is widely documented that
individual programmers engage in developing software in open source en-
vironments that provides no immediate direct (monetary) payoﬀs for their
programming eﬀort4. Why do they get involved in such ventures? Equally
well, commercial software companies do support and subsidize such open
source communities in various ways.5What is the motivation behind Þrms
behavior given that these communities may potentially be even harmful as
providing free open source programs that compete with their own commer-
cial copyright programs?
The main idea of this paper is to show within the formal model that
indeed such a behavior may be fully rational. It can be explained by the in-
centives of independent programmers to participate in open source projects
in order to signal their innate ability (productivity or programming ability)
to commercial software companies. That is, we base our work on skill sig-
nalling approach (c.f. Lerner and Tirole 2002), and develop a simple labor
market skill signalling model that extends Spences (1973, 1974) seminal
work into a case where the signalling activity itself has an externality eﬀect
that is coming through product markets. Already Spence discussed the pos-
sibility of education increasing productivity, but the case where the labor
market signalling has an externality eﬀect via the product market is, to the
best of our knowledge, novel. In fact, our approach is general enough to
incorporate both positive and negative product market externalities. That
is, we can handle both complementary and substitute products, and conse-
quently this means that the receiver of signal (i.e. the commercial software
company) may beneÞt or be hurt due to it. As examples, Openoﬃce is likely
to be a complement to commercial operating systems like Windows, whereas
Linux is a substitute for them. Moreover, in our case the signalling activity
as such is not social waste since it will eventually realize in a free product
(software) that consumers value.
In our model, there are three types of players: programmers, Þrms and
consumers, who will interact in two types of market: labor market and prod-
uct market. Programmers engage themselves in open source programming
projects. The peculiar licensing structure of open source - one example is
the GPL (copyleft) license (GNU 2000a,2000b) - preserves the link between
4For descriptions of open source, see Raymond 1998, Browne 1999, GNU 2000a, 2000b,
Kogut and Metiu 2001 and Lerner and Tirole 2002.
5See IBM News 2001, Collab.net 2001, Hann et al. 2002, Mustonen 2002b.
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the originator and the program code while making the program public and
freely available. We analyze programmers (who diﬀer in their innate abil-
ity) signalling by open source programming and software companies hiring
and derive a PBE of this signalling game.
We start by providing a benchmark result which shows that the case
considered in Spences classical work will turn out to be a special case of
ours when the signalling externality eﬀect (that we choose to emphasize)
is not present because programs are independent. Then, not surprisingly,
we show that in the case of substitutes the programming credential needed
to separate the good type from the bad type is lower than in the case
of independent programs. This we can interpret as indicating that in the
case of substitutes the commercial software companies are willing to provide
lower wages (due to negative product market externality), and thus in the
equilibrium the least cost separating programming credential is lower as well.
In the end this means that in terms of quality (as lines of code transforming
into the functionality of a program), the substitute open source programs
have lower quality than the independent programs. Similarly, we can show
that in the case complementary programs, the equilibrium programming
credential will be higher than in the case of independent programs, and thus
the resulting free open source programs will have higher quality (more lines
of code, and thus functionality). In the case of complementary programs,
it may interestingly even be the case that it is impossible for good types to
separate from bad ones given that the product externality eﬀect is strong
enough, and thus one has a pooling equilibrium.
In another version of the basic model we discuss the role of an open
source project as a screening device. In that case we assume there exists a
high enough outside option wage that implies that the commercial software
companies cannot even exist without screening of workers. It is shown that
they may indeed be willing to subsidize open source projects in order to
be able to screen workers to enjoy non-negative proÞts. At the end, we
discuss some welfare issues and point out that there may be a conßict of
interest, since the individual programmer (and the software company) does
not internalize the beneÞcial eﬀects that are coming via the consumers
surplus.
It is interesting to contrast our theoretical model with what happens in
software industry in practise. In reality, open source software projects do
have home pages on internet where they in fact post merit-based ranking lists
of the most important contributors (Hann et al. 2002, Linux-PAM 2003).
They could even be called as hall of fames. The fact that a programmer is
at the top of the list implies that he/she has contributed to the project in a
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major way by providing important or even crucial pieces of code (parts of a
program). We interpret this as being a programming credential that signals
the programmers innate abilities. That is, for a more able programmer it
is easier to get the top position at the merit based list.
In their recent paper Hann, Roberts and Slaughter (2002) provide Þrst
empirical evidence of economic incentives of individual programmers within
the Apache web-server open source project.6 Their empirical results conÞrm
the existence of economic returns; participation per se as measured by the
numbers of contributions made does not lead to wage increases, but a higher
status in a merit-based ranking does lead to signiÞcantly higher wages. A
higher status in a merit-based ranking list is a credible signal of the pro-
ductive capacity of a programmer. Thus their work gives support for the
delayed returns argument - motivation for participation is skill signalling7.
Commercial software companies are willing to pay for high wages for the top
performers i.e. they interpret a high position at the merit-based ranking list
as a signal of high innate productivity.
In the open source literature one can distinguish two lines of literature;
incentive based approach (Johnson 2002, Bessen 2001) and market analysis
(Lerner and Tirole 2002, Mustonen 2002a). Schiﬀ (2002) provides a survey
of the early literature. This paper combines the two lines of arguments by
developing a single model that incorporates the idea of signalling in labor
market with externality in product market due to appearance of free open
source programs, and where moreover the product market eﬀect may be
harmful or beneÞcial to the receiver of signal. The novelty of this paper is
that introduces a new way how the signalling may work and it also provides
a new reason for why Þrms may participate in and subsidize open source
projects.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In next section we
present the model and the main analysis is carried out in section 3. In
section 4 we show that commercial software companies do have incentives
to support open source projects in order to screen their work force. Section
5 focuses on the welfare issues and section 6 concludes.
6Apache is used in 63% of the worlds over 100 million web servers (Netcraft 2001).
7For discussions on delayed returns, we refer to Dasgupta and David (1987,1994),
Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) and Stern (1999).
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2 The Model
In this section we set up the model by Þrst describing the parties involved
and the markets where they meet and interact. On purpose, we follow the
exact notation of Spence (1974) as closely as possible. In particular, we
want to emphasize that the case considered in Spences classical article will
turn out to be a special case of ours when the signalling externality eﬀect
(that we choose to emphasize) is not present.
2.1 Players: programmers, software companies and consumers
We consider a model with three types players who will interact in two types
of markets. We have workers called as programmers who develop computer
software either within the open source projects or within Þrms called as
commercial software companies. Finally there are consumers who value
available computer software. The two markets we consider are labor markets
where computer programmers and software companies interact and products
markets where consumers decide whether they buy a commercially produced
software or acquire an open source software for free.
2.2 Labor Market: programmers, software companies and
the signalling externality k
We assume there exists two types of programmers, who diﬀer only in their
innate non-veriÞable ability. It is assumed that the high productivity pro-
grammers (good type) have a marginal productivity of 2 (units of program
code per unit of time) and the low productivity programmers (bad type)
have a marginal productivity of 1, and that the share of good types is equal
to q1, and thus (1−q1) stands for the share of low productivity programmers.
In order to separate from the low productivity programmer, the high
productivity programmer may engage himself in an open source program-
ming project. If an individual programmers contribution to the open source
programming project is large enough, his name will appear in the projects
top contributors or hall of fame list, which is public information.8 We call
this a programming credential and label it by y.
Notice that y bears a similarity to Spences term education level in the
sense that a given level is more easily attainable for a high productivity pro-
8 In reality such information is often posted on the open source projects homepages in
the internet. See Linux -PAM (2003) and consult Hann et al (2002).
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grammer. Interestingly, within the context of open source programming, the
programming credential may have an externality eﬀect. The programmers
eﬀort to separate (i.e. to signal his ability) is directed to writing program
code to the open source program. We deÞne that for a programming creden-
tial level of y, the programmers eﬀort is manifested in |k|y lines of program
code that aﬀects the consumer market for software.
We interpret k as an externality eﬀect from skill signalling because the
outcome of the open source programming project is freely available to con-
sumers. Notice that the externality we describe is novel and diﬀers from the
possible productivity eﬀect that already Spence discussed. He acknowledged
that acquiring education as such may increase the employees productivity,
so that the productivity of good type after attaining education level y be-
comes 2 + y/4. In contrast to that, here the productivity of employees
remains unchanged but the product market, where the commercial software
company is present, is aﬀected via a positive or negative externality eﬀect
as described above.
Finally, the programmers utilities are assumed to depend on the wage
and the disutility of attaining the credential,
UG = w− y
2
, UB = w − y.
In above G refers to good, high productivity type and B to bad, low
productivity type each attaining programming credential y and earning the
wage w.
2.3 Product market: consumers and software companies
It is assumed that there exists a market niche where a Þrm supplies its
commercial software to consumers. The commercial program supplied by
the Þrm is developed by hiring a programmer, and in order to simplify we
assume that the size of the Þrms programming project is equal to one.
That is, each Þrm hires one programmer and develops one program. If the
Þrm hires a good programmer, the size of the program (as lines of code)
is S = 2 and if it hires a bad one, the size is S = 1. When the Þrm does
not screen programmers ex ante, the expected size of the program thus is
S = 2q1 + (1− q1) = q1 + 1.
We assume that there are M consumers, each buying at most one unit
of either program9. They assess the programs available on the market and
9The market analysis draws on Koboldt (1995).
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value them by their size (lines of code). The more a program contains code,
the better is its functionality (it has more and better properties), and the
more valuable it is from the consumers point of view. Let the consumers
valuation of the Þrms copyright program VR be evenly distributed on the
interval [0, hS], where h > 0 is a parameter transforming program size S
(lines of code) to willingness to pay.
For the open source program, we can distinguish three cases depending
the relationship of it and the commercially supplied program. First, the
open source program may be a complement to the commercially supplied
program. The eﬀects of this complementarity are characterized by a positive
externality, k > 0. It is assumed that due to this complementarity between
the programs, consumers valuation of the commercial software program
is increased. The valuation for that product is evenly distributed on the
interval [0, h (S + ky)] . That is, due to the appearance of free open source
software, consumers have an access to ky lines of code, creating valuable
additional features.
Secondly and most interestingly, the open source program may be a
competing substitute to the commercially produced program, and thus we
have a case of negative externality, k < 0. Notice that consumers valuation
of the Þrms copyright program, VR, is unchanged and belongs to the interval
[0, hS] . Their valuation of the open source program, VO, in turn is evenly
distributed on the interval [0,−hky] . We additionally assume that in the
case of substitutes, the ratio of the valuations of the copyright and open
source programs is constant for all consumers.
Finally, the open source program may be totally independent i.e. it does
not aﬀect the consumer market of commercial software in any way, and quite
naturally in this case k = 0.We notice that this last case of zero externality
resembles Spences original analysis, and indeed in section 3 we demonstrate
this to be case in our model.
The proposed structure characterizes an open source programming project
in two dimensions. First, the magnitude of parameter k describes how
much of the programming credential transforms into functionality of an open
source program that consumers value. Second, the sign of k expresses the
nature of the open source program i.e. whether it competes with or comple-
ments the commercial program.
We have deÞned consumers valuations and can turn into describing a
software companys proÞt maximizing behavior; it sets the price in order
to maximize revenues. As the willingness to pay is uniformly distributed,
we have the case of linear demands. When programs are complements, the
inverted demand function for the commercial program reads
8
p = h (S + ky)− h (S + ky)
M
x, (1)
where x is the number of consumers who will buy the commercial software.
In the case of substitutes it is the marginal consumer that is indiﬀerent
between the commercial program and the open source program that deter-
mines the demand for the commercial program. Note that the open source
program has zero price and we deÞned k < 0 in the case of substitutes. For
the marginal consumer i with valuations VRi, VOi holds
VRi − p = VOi. (2)
We assume throughout the analysis that the ratio of valuations is con-
stant to all consumers, implying VRiVOi =
hS
−hky . Inserting this in (2) and
manipulating yields
VRi =
S
S + ky
p. (3)
Our assumption that willingness to pay for the Þrms copyright program
is evenly distributed implies that the number of consumers that have a higher
willingness to pay than the marginal consumer i is x = S−VRiS M . Solving
for VRi and inserting it in (3) yields the inverted demand function for the
commercial program in the case of substitutes
p = h (S + ky)− h (S + ky)
M
x.
And as we can observe, the inverted demand functions for complement
and substitute commercial programs are identical. The Þrms revenue max-
imization yields the optimum price p∗ = h(S+ky)2 , and then the optimum
quantity x∗ = 12M . The revenue function is both in the case of a comple-
ment and a substitute
R =
h (S + ky)
4
M. (4)
In fact we can use (4) to represent all cases. In the case of an independent
open source program, we deÞned k = 0. In such a case, the Þrm sets an
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unconstrained monopoly price and the revenue function is R = hS4 M. Note
that though the revenue functions are identical in the cases of a complement
and a substitute open source program, the market outcomes are quite dif-
ferent. For a complement, the same consumers that would have bought the
Þrms program anyway are willing to pay more of the very program. In the
case of substitutes some consumers buy the commercial program and the
rest of the consumers acquire the open source program for free. This dis-
tinction will become important in welfare analysis. In order to simplify our
notation in the rest of the paper we deÞne variable a = hM4 that captures
the market size eﬀect. The Þrms revenue thus becomes
R = a (S + ky) .
In order to be viable the Þrm has to hire a programmer, and following
Spence we assume that the programmers have all the bargaining power in
the labor market. This implies that the commercial software companies will
compete for the programmers and end up with zero proÞts
π = R−w = a (S + ky)−w = 0.
2.4 The Strategies, solution concept and timing
In the labor market, strategies (yB, yG, w
∗) and a system of beliefs form an
equilibrium. In particular, we use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
as a solution concept. The building block for using it is the assumption
that the success achieved within an open source programming project (i.e.
received programming credential) is regarded by commercial software com-
panies as a credible signal of an individual programmers innate ability or
simply productivity.
We assume that each programmer chooses the amount of programming
work to do within the open source project to get a position in a merit-based
ranking list given the wage function w∗(S, y) = a(S + ky) (We remind that
S = 2 for a good and S = 1 for a bad programmer). The low productivity
bad type faces a problem
yB ∈ argmaxy [w
∗(1, y)− y],
and the high productivity good type
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yG ∈ argmaxy [w
∗(2, y)− y
2
].
The software company hires a programmer with a programming creden-
tial y (i.e. position at the merit based ranking list) at wage
w∗(S, y) = β∗(1 | y)a (1 + kyB) + (1− β∗(1 | y))a (2 + kyG)
with beliefs β∗ that are consistent with strategies. In particular, if the
optimal credential levels diﬀer, yB 6= yG, then if y ≤ yB, β∗(1 | y) = 1 and if
one observes y ≥ yG, β∗(1 | y) = 0. Of course, in the case when the optimal
credential levels coincide, yB = yG, then if observed credential y = yB = yG,
β∗(1 | y) = 1− q1. It is widely known that the predictive power of PBE is
weak in a sense that it does not restrain the out of equilibrium beliefs.
Thus in the rest of the paper we use the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion to
restrain out of equilibrium beliefs and focus on the least cost separable (lcs)
equilibrium, where the low productivity programmer chooses zero credential
and the high productivity programmer in turn picks up the smallest possible
level of credential that allows separation.
In the product market, the Þrm sets its price to maximize proÞts and
consumers either buy one unit of commercial copy right program or they
prefer one unit of a free open source product.
Timing of the model can be summarized as below:
0. Nature assigns productivities 1, 2 and the proportion of high produc-
tivity programmers is q1.
1. A programmer may engage himself in an open source programming
project thus obtaining a programming credential y (a status on a merit-based
ranking list) and thus creating an OS program with |k|y lines of program
code.
2. A commercial software company is willing to hire a programmer with
conditions {w, y}.
3. A company employs a programmer whose status is at least equal to
y at wage w.
4. A company develops a copyright program of quality S.
5. Consumers buy the copyright program or acquire the open source
program for free.
6. ProÞts are realized and wages are paid.
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3 The Analysis
In this section we analyze the optimal behavior of programmers in labor
market and demonstrate what are the implications of skill signalling exter-
nalities. When individual programmers decide in what extend they partici-
pate in OS projects in order to signal their skills they do this by anticipating
the wage oﬀer of the commercial software company. In Spence the Þrm of-
fers a wage that is equal to the expected productivity of employees and all
the bargaining power lies with the employee and the Þrm proÞt depends
only the employees productivity. In addition to this relationship we present
an another one arising from the impact of the open source program in the
product market.
To start with it is useful to recall that due to competition in labor market
the Þrm pays its full revenue as wage, w (S, y) = a (S + ky) . Individual pro-
grammers engaging themselves in OS projects choose the optimal credential
levels yG and yB by maximizing their utility
max
yG
UG = w
∗(2, y)− yG
2
,
max
yB
UB = w
∗(1, y)− yB
given the wage function ,
w∗(S, y) = β∗(1 | y)a (1 + kyB) + (1− β∗(1 | y))a (2 + kyG) .
The incentive compatibility constraints for good and bad types read
a (2 + kyG)− yG
2
≥ a (1 + kyB)− yB
2
a (1 + kyB)− yB ≥ a (2 + kyG)− yG (5)
As we are focusing on the least cost separating equilibrium, it is clear
that yB 6= yG. Moreover, since getting a credential is costly, it is optimal
for the bad type not to get one, i.e. yB = 0. Therefore, from the binding
low productivity types IC -constraint (5) we can solve yG =
a
1−ak . Thus we
have yB = 0, β
∗(1 | 0) = 1 and yG = a1−ak , β∗(1 | a1−ak ) = 0. And the wages
are w∗B = a, w
∗
G = a
³
2 + k a1−ak
´
.
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The resulting lcs equilibrium has the following properties. The bad type
Þnds it optimal not to take part in the open source project, and thus
yB = 0.
The programming credential requires such a large programming under-
taking from him that the high wage cannot compensate the disutility of
programming work (signalling). The good programmer contributes to the
OS project in such a way that that the least-cost credential for the good
programmer to separate is
yG =
a
1− ak .
A possible interpretation of the least cost equilibrium is that the good
programmer chooses from numerous potential OS projects the one which
just takes him to the merit-based list with activity yG.
In lcs equilibrium, the utilities of the programmers are
UB = a
UG = 2a+
(2ak − 1)a
2 (1− ak)
Before stating the actual results in the case when externalities are present,
we observe the following. First, we have already mentioned that in the case
of no externality, our results resemble those of Spence. To see this let us
assume for a moment that k = 0 and in addition that the market size eﬀect,
a = 1 as in Spence. In this case we have yB = 0, yG = 1, UB = 1 and
UG = 2 and we have
Lemma 1 In the case of zero market externality and in the absence of
market size eﬀect, our results coincide with those of Spence (1973, 1974):
yB = 0, yG = 1, UB = 1 and UG = 2.
Secondly, it is useful to notice for later purposes that the amount of
programming credential the good type has to put forward in order to signal
credibly his type depends on the magnitude of market externality, and this
of course aﬀects also the utility level of the good type:
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∂yG
∂k
> 0,
∂UG
∂k
> 0. (6)
As we have now derived the least cost programming credential needed to
separate a good type from the bad one we can state some interesting results
concerning credential with regard to the market externality:
Proposition 2 The least-cost programming credential that separates the
good programmer from the bad is higher when the programs are complements
than when they are substitutes.
Proof. It is enough to notice that in the case of a complement (k > 0),
yG =
a
1−ak is larger than in the case of a substitute (k < 0).
When the open source programming project creates a substitute to the
Þrms program in the consumer market the good programmer suﬀers from
the market externality. The competition in the consumer market lowers the
Þrms proÞt and thus ultimately the wage of the good programmer once he
is hired by the commercial software company.
Proposition 3 The high productivity (good) programmers utility is higher
when the programs are complements than when they are substitutes.
Proof. This is clear from UG = 2a+
(2ak−1)a
2(1−ak) .
When the OS program is a complement to the Þrms commercial pro-
gram, the increase in disutility resulting from the higher programming cre-
dential is dominated by the increased proÞts and thus wages. The impli-
cation of this is that if the good programmers can determine the nature
of the OS project, they prefer a project that results in a complement pro-
gram, k > 0, and one where as much as possible of the eﬀort is directed to
programming activity that consumers ultimately value (large |k|).
Proposition 4 In the case of a complement OS program and given that the
market externality is strong enough, k > 1a , the good types cannot separate
from the bad ones and thus we have a pooling equilibrium of yB = yG = 0.
Proof. This is clear from yG =
a
1−ak that represents the minimum of
programming credential, since in the case of strong externality, k > 1a , yG
becomes negative, which of course is impossible. Thus we have a case where
both types do not acquire any programming credential at all, yB = yG = 0.
14
The nature of the OS project matters a lot. From the good programmers
point of view, the most preferred project entails creating a complement to
the Þrms program. However, the outcome must not be excessively valued
by consumers. If k > 1a , the optimal least cost programming credential
to separate does not exist. Why is this so? To state it a bit diﬀerently
than in the proof above, the incentive compatibility constraint of the low
productivity programmer to mimic the good one does not hold for any ed-
ucation credential. The reason is that the market externality eﬀect of the
OS work, performed even by the low productivity programmer, dominates
the disutility of it.
The Þrm itself does not care of the nature of the OS project, since it
loses all market revenue in the bargaining with the programmer. However,
we can raise some general issues based on the results. First of all, if the
OS program is a substitute and highly valued by consumers, the good pro-
grammer achieves the least cost programming credential with small eﬀort.
Is this a dependable signal of productivity in the Þrms large project? Of
the complement program project, we can ask whether programming a com-
plement, maybe using techniques diﬀerent from the Þrms project, acts as a
dependable signal?
4 Do software companies have incentives to sup-
port open source projects?
In the following, we make an assumption that there exists an outside em-
ployment option with wage wo, and this outside option is accessible for both
the low and high productivity programmers10. In particular, we want to
examine now a situation where the level of outside wage is such that the
software company is not proÞtable if it hires a programmer blindly. That is
R = a (1 + q1)−wo < 0.
Now it is clear that simply to exist in the Þrst place, the company has to
screen programmers and then by hiring the high productivity programmer
it makes a positive market revenue. As before, since the programmer holds
the bargaining power in the labor market, he receives all the revenue as
wages. In particular, we want to demonstrate that under these conditions
it is in the commercial software companys interest to create and support
10The analysis has similarities with the textbook model of Hirschleifer and Riley (1992).
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open source programming projects and use them as screening devices. One
could even interpret this as an outsourcing of personnel management (or
recruiting) activities.
For simplicity, we assume that the support for open source projects is
materialized in the form of a lump-sum payment F . Then the proÞt of
the commercial software company reads as π = a
¡
2 + kyFG
¢ − F − w = 0,
where yFG is determined by the bad programmers incentive compatibility
constraint with respect to the outside wage w0,
a
¡
2 + kyFG
¢− F − yFG ≥ wo. (7)
The least-cost separating level of programming credential is
yFG =
2a−wo − F
1− ak (8)
From (8) we can see that the software company can provide Þnancial
support for the OS project up to the diﬀerence between the market revenue
from its program created by a good programmer and the outside wage,
F < 2a − wo, and quite naturally the least cost separating credential is
decreasing in F . The consideration we expressed earlier is relevant here
also. If the level of credential is very low, it may not be a dependable signal.
So we can summarize the above discussion as:
Lemma 5 The software companies do have incentives to support open source
software projects in order to use them as screening devices for their new labor
force.
5 Welfare Analysis
Consider now the possibility that a society as such is able to choose the
nature of an open source project, i.e. whether it is a complement or a sub-
stitute to commercial copyright program. As we noted the market outcomes
are diﬀerent and this has a bearing on the resulting levels of welfare. We
measure welfare as the net of surplus, that is the sum of Þrms proÞts and
consumer surplus minus the disutility of the programmer. Again we assume
the existence of the outside wage wo. Now to get a bit more general view of
welfare issues we characterize programmers with productivities θG > θB > 0
instead of 2 and 1. This is simply due to the fact that in the welfare analysis
the productivity diﬀerence does matter. Now equation (7) in the case when
F = 0 yields
16
a (θG + kyG)− yG
θL
≥ wo.
This in turn implies the that the least cost programming credential to
separate is
yG =
θB (aθG −wo)
1− akθB .
In the case of a complement OS program, welfare reads
WC (a, k) =
3
2
a
µ
θG + k
θB (aθG −wo)
1− akθB
¶
− θB (aθG −wo)
θG (1− akθB) .
When program are substitutes, welfare is
WS (a, k) =
3
2
a
µ
θG − 1
3
k
θB (aθG −wo)
1− akθB
¶
− θB (aθG −wo)
θG (1− akθB) .
The welfare measures allow us to assess whether the result of OS project
with a given level of market externality should be either a complement or a
substitute to the Þrms commercial program from the societys point of view.
In order to facilitate comparisons, we use the same magnitude of the market
externality eﬀect, m, in both cases. Figure 1 below depicts how the least
cost credentials are determined in both cases. Straightforward comparison
of welfare functions gives us
Proposition 6 Welfare is higher with a substitute OS program than with
a complement when a < 2θB−θG2θGθBm , where m = |k| is the level of market
externality of the open source program.
Proof. Developing the inequality WC (a,m) < WS (a,−m) yields the
following inequality.
3
2
aθG +
3am
2 (1− amθB) −
1
θG (1− amθB) <
3
2
aθG +
am
2 (1 + amθB)
− 1
θG (1 + amθB)
It simpliÞes into
a <
2θB − θG
2θGθBm
.
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Figure 1: The optimal programming credential in the case of a substitute
and a complement OS program
18
Recalling that a = hM4 , the condition implies that when the consumer
market is small compared to the programmer population or when consumers
have low valuations of the programs, the welfare associated with OS project
resulting in a substitute program is higher. With our speciÞcations, larger
welfare with a substitute open source program is possible if the productivity
diﬀerence between the programmers is small; the good programmer is less
than twice as productive as the bad one. The threshold market size is
decreasing in the market externality of the OS project,m. When market size
increases, proÞts and consumers surplus dominate the good programmers
increased disutility of separation with a complement open source project.
Note also that the market outcomes diﬀer: with a substitute, all con-
sumers use some program, whereas with a complement only a half of con-
sumers use the Þrms program and the complementing OS program. If
distributional considerations are included in the analysis, the threshold of
the proposition is likely to be higher.
We proved earlier that for a given level of market externality, the good
programmer always prefers an open source project that results in a comple-
ment program. The welfare analysis shows that when the condition of the
proposition holds, society would choose a project producing a substitute,
since the programmer does not internalize the beneÞcial eﬀects coming via
the consumers surplus.
6 Conclusion
This paper has extended the classic article of job market signalling by Spence
into the situation where the signalling activity itself may have interesting
externality eﬀects that are coming through via products markets. In par-
ticular, we considered two cases where the product developed within the
open source project and the commercial program were either complements
or substitutes. As was also demonstrated, the case of no product market
externality resembles the classic result of Spence. The particular example
that we chose to emphasize was related to job signalling in the software in-
dustry. However we believe that the phenomenon exists in other areas too.
Consider, for example, that a Masters degree in a university requires the
completion of a thesis. This literary output might compete with or comple-
ment a commercial (text)book of the potential employer interested in hiring
the graduate. Our focus on OSS is motivated by the virtuality of software
and the resulting possibly strong market responses to the availability of free
OS software. Of course, it is important to realize that our analysis is partial
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in a sense that we focus on one market niche only. In reality, it may very
well be that even if the OS software is independent in this particular market
niche we examine, it may well have external (positive or negative ) eﬀects
on some other market niche. This is a natural question to be examined in
future studies.
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